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The failure of export subsidies, particularly  in Argentina,  should
remind  us to distinguish  what is possible from what is likely. In
Latin  America  the money  would be better  spent on infrastruc-
ture, health,  and education.
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Twenty years ago, it was believed that export  two different goals on subsidies and countervail-
subsidies would produce more diversification  ing measures (CVMs). Supporters of subsidies
and better export performance. This has not  want to make it more difficult to introduce
happened.  Why?  CVMs; countervailers want more stringent rules
on subsidies. Both subsidies and CVMs are
In most cases, export subsidies were not  viewed as good policies by their users.  But
supported by more open import policies - so  empirical evidence does not support these
subsidies reduced only marginally the anti-  pol eies, and export subsidies and CVMs entail
export bias of Latin American countries. Un-  other costs to the societies using them.
stable real exchange rates have also hurt exports.
The failure of export subsidies, particularly
Export subsidies appear to have imnproved  in Argentina, should remind us of the impor-
exports in Brazil, which also liberalized imports,  tance of distinguishing what is possible from
significantly stabilized real exchange rates, and  what is likely, contends the author. The likeli-
promoted other policies conducive to export  hood of subsidies improving exports is low,
growth.  Yet Mexico, after reducing import  when they are applied in a context of high
barriers, also enjoyed improved exports - with  import protection and unstable real exchange
minimum export subsidies, and with apparently  rates.
lower social costs than Brazil experienced.
FinaUy, export subsidies compete with other
Export subsidies have failed in other Latin  government programs and - especially consid-
American countries - and particularly hurt  ering their failure rate - should be dismantled
development in Argentina, where fraud, corrup-  in this period when the welfare of Latin Ameri-
tion and rent-seeking have been rampant.  cans has declined dramatically.  The money
would be better spent on infrastructure, health,
Participants in the current Uruguay Round  and education projects.
of intemational negotiations seem to be seeking
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There is general  agreement,  that the crisis  of Latin-America  has
entailed  important  social  and economic  costs. One consequence,  has  been the
declining  amount  of resources  that  is  left  to the  governments,  after  whatever
service  of their  debts  they  make.  Under  these  circumstances,  the importance
of  allocating available  resources in  socially productive projects,
increases;  think about the plight  of Latin-America's  pe_ple in terms of
declining  real  wages  and  declining  quality  and  quantity  of social  programs  in
areas  such  as  health  and  education  with  high  social  payoffs.
A traditional  subsidy  program  of  Latin-American  governments  has been
in  favor  of  non-traditional  export  activities.  The  purpose  of this  paper,  is
to provide  an answer  to the question  of whether  the experience  of Latin
American  countries  with those  subsidies  has been positive  or negative. In
doing  this,  I  will  discuss  several  dimensions  of  export  subsidy  programs. The
first,  refers  to the  extent  to  which  these  subisidies  have  met  the  objectives
which  economists  and  policymakers  had  when  they  were initially  launched  more
than twenty  years  ago.  This is done in sections  II and III.  The later
section also examines  Brazil, which i3  a  country credited with having
*  I appreciate  helpful  coments from  Bela  Balassa,  Elvio  Baldinelli,  Refik
Erzan, J. Michael Finger  and Paul Meo.  I also appreciate  research
assistance  provided  by Ms.  Azita  Amjadi  and  efficient  word processing  by
Mrs. SalomA  Torrijos. Remaing  errors  are  my responsibility.  The views
expressed  here  should  not  be  attributed  those  of  the  World  Bank.
Paper  Presented  at the  Workshop  on  "Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures:
Critical  Issues  Faced  in the  Uruguay  Round"  held in  Montreux,  Switzerland
on February  13-14,  1989.-2-
successful  export subsidy  policies  and contrasts  it with Mexico who has
eliminated  most of its export  subsidies  and still  has enjoyed  high export
growth.
The  second dimension,  refers to the welfare effects of subsidy
policies  in terms  of r2source  allocation. Finally,  an evaluation  of export
subsidies  would  be  incomplete,  without  a  discussion  of their  political-economy
consequences.  T.hese  two dimensions  of export subsidies  are analyzed in
section  IV.
Section  V draws  a parallel  between  the  consequences  of subsidies  for
the subsilizers  and countervailing  measures  for  the coitntervailers.  Section
VI concludes  the  paper  with  some  final  remarks.
II. Arguments  and  Policy  Environment  Surrounding  Export  Subsidies
In this  section  I  will start  by summarizing  the  major  arguments  that
historically  supported  eitport  subsidy  policies. From the  point  of view of
this  paper,  recent  arguments  in favor  of subsidies  such  as those  of strategic
trade  theory  are not discussed. It has  only  been  recently  that these  ideas
have been used to support  subsidy  policies.  Thus, more time is necessary
before  an empirical  evaluation  of strategic  subsidy  policies  is  made.
The second  part  of this  section,  will  discuss  the  policy  environment
in which subsidies  have been working.  In particular,  I  focus  on import
protection  and  stability  of the  real  exchange  rate.
1.  Arguments  in favor  of  export  subsidies
A major  concern  when  subsidies  were  initially  introduced  was  the  high
concentration  of  exports  in  a few  commodities  and  the  vulnerability  that  this-3-
implied.  I/  These  were  the  years  (late  1950s  and  early  1960s),  when export
pessimism  was spreading  as Latin  America's  terms  of trade  were projected  to
decline  (Prebisch,  1959). In retrospect,  it should  be noted  thiat,  these  were
also  the  years  when  industrial  countries  were  making  their  greatest  post-World
War II efforts  to reduce  trade  barriers. The 60s were also the  years  when
some developing countries --  for example, Korea - were starting to profit
from the increasing  trade openness  of  industrial  countries.  But these
experiences,  as well as the lessons  derived from them, never played an
important role  in  shaping the  policy recommendations  of  the  Economic
Commission  for  Latin  America  (ECLA);  Latin-America's  think  tank  during  the  6Vs
and  70s.
Given  the  poor  export  performance  of Latin  American  countries  during
the 50s, Prebisch  (1959)  in particular  and ECLA  more generally,  recommended
regional  integration  as  a way  out  of balance  of payments  difficulties.  These
policies  were aimed  at increasing  the exports  of the industries  which had
grown behind  high protective  barriers. Discriminatory  export  subsidies  in
favor  of the  same  protected  industries  were  a  natural  corollary  of integration
policies.
A  second argument  in defense of export subsidies  was built on
Keynesian  assumptions. For example,  Schydlowsky  (1968),  developed  a model
where he  showed  that higher  manufactured  exports  could solve  Argentina's
1/  In some  cases,  the  goal  of  export  diversification  was  explicitly  mentioned
in the subsidy  programs. For example,  one  can read  in the introductory
considerations  of Decree  No. 3056 of 1970  which implemented  the fiscal
reimbursement  program  of Argentina  that"...  higher  value  added,  and the
characteristics  of  the  products whose  exports are  promoted  (by
reimbursements),  will  support  the  diversification  of exports..."  (Author's
translation).- 4  -
unemployment  and  excess  capacity  problems. In order  to increase  manufactured
exports,  he recomended that  discriminatory  export  subsidies  be introduced.
Schydlowsky  went  as  far  as  arguing  that  the  increased  taxes  forthcoming  from
economic  activity  induced  by more manufactured  exports  could finance  the
subsidies  and  even  result  in  a fiscal  surplus.
The influence  of these  ideas  should  not be dismissed. Only a few
years  ago, in  a  report  prepared  for  the  Association  of Exporters  of Perua  (the
lobby for non-traditional  exports),  Schydlowsky  and collaborators  (1983)
recommended  again that the structure  of discriminatory  export  subsidies  be
increased.  After some hesitation  and changes  of key personalities,  these
policy  suggestions  were  implemented.
In contrast  to  Keynesian  models,  subsidies  in  neoclassical  models  are
based  on  market failures and  second-best  policies.  The  theoretical
underpinnings  of the  neoclassicai  theory  of subsidies  goes  back to Bhagwati
and Ramauwani  ' 1963).  Nevertheless,  Bhagwati  and Ramaswami  concluded  that
when the goal was to increase  the  output  of a specific  insdustry  production
subsidies  are  superior  to  tariffs.
Finally,  an important  iustification  for  export  subsidies  was  proposed
by Balassa (1975).  He stated  that the application  of "...  a  tariff-cum-
subsidy  scheme  will have  the same  effect  as production  subsidies,  except  for
the fact that higher  prices  paid by the  consumer  will distort  consumption
patterns"  (Balassa,  1975,  p. 373).
The truth  of the  matter  is that  reality  has  been  quite  different  for
the  world  these  models  depicted.  For  example,  over  tthe  long  run,  the  te-nns  of
trade  between  commodities  and  manufactures  have  remained.quite  stable  (Grilli
and  Yan,  1988).  Furthermore, in  Latin  America, unemployment arxd- 5 -
underemploymnt should  be attributed  more to structural  and policy-induced
rigidities  than to the weakness  of aggregate  demand.  In this environment,
export  subsidies  have  merely  added  to the  inflationary  pressures  of government
deficits.
There  h,s  also  beern much  confusion regarding the  policy
recommendations  of  neoclassical  models. For  example,  it is  usually  said  that
preshipment  export  credit  is  "...  necessary  to offset  domestic  capital  market
distortion  or anti-export  biases  in product  markets...  "  As a  matter of
policy  oehavior,  however,  only  "....  the  former  rationale  would  satisfy  this
condition,  and only to the extent  that empirical  evidence  demonstrates  a
capital  market  distortion..."  (Fitzgerald  and  Monson,  1987).
Finally, regarding export diversification  and  improved export
performance,  the  reality  shows  that  in only  a  few  cases  has  this  occurred. I
will argue that this should  not be taken  as evidence  in support  of export
pessimism,  but  as a consequence  of the fact  that  the  policies  of many  Latin-
American  economies  for  which  export  subsidies  were  recommended  simply  did not
provide the environment  for manufactured  exports to flourish  and export
diversification  to increase  over time.  This environment  was characterized
among  other  things  by  high  anti-export  bias  and  unstable  real  exchange  rates.
2.  Anti-export  bias  and  real  exchange  rate  behavior
A country's  export  performance  depends  on a number  of policies
including  exchange  rates, subsidies  incidence  of taxes  on exports,  import
protection,  mobility  of factor  markets,  openness  to  direct  foreign  investment,
etc.,  etc.  The purpose  of this  section  is to  concentrate  on two  of the  most
important  determinants  of export  performance,  namely  import  protection  and the
real  exchange  rates  (RER).-6-
2.1 Anti-export  bias
Historically,  it is  well  kno-n,  that  starting  with the  crash  of the
1930s,  a majority  of Latin-American  countries  embraced  import-substitution
policies  (Balassa,  1982).  The major  exception  to this  trend  was PerA,  who
during  the  50s,  remained  integrated  into  the  world  economy  (Nogu6s  1989).
As said, the policies  followed  by Latin  American  countries,  when
balance  of payments  problems  continued  to delay development,  was one of
maintaining  and in some cases  increasing  protection  and reinforcing  it with
integration  and  export  subsidy  policies.
But,  because  protection  was  so  high,  these  policies  reduced  the  anti-
export  bias only  marginally. Until  the late  7Os,  only three  countries  had
introduced  liberalization  policies.  These  were  Brazil  and  Columbia  in  the  60s
and  Chile  in  the  7Os.  Brazil and  Columbia later reversed to  more
protectionist  policies. It has  only  been  in  recent  years  that  more  countries
including  Bolivia  and  Mexico  are  introducing  trade  liberalization  measures.
In summary,  for  decades  many  Latin-American  economies  have remained
heavily  protected.  In  order  to  analyze  the  anti-export  bias  during  the  80s,  I
use US countervailing  duties (CVDs)  as a proxy for the height  of export
subsidies.  Before  commenting  on the fidings,  it is important  to spell  out
some  shortcomings.  First, CVDs  are  based  on  a  limited number of
observations.  In our case,  the  estimates  are  based  on a  maximum  of 19 cases
for Mexico  and a  minimum  of 1  case for  Chile.  These  sample  sizes  are too
small  to  claim  representativeness.
Second,  if  the  US  foliows  the  guidelines  of the  Subsidy  Code  (Article
4), its  estimates  of subsidy  margins  should  be conservative.  On the other
hand, when the US is unable  to obtain information  from the subsidizing- 7  -
government,  it  uses  information  provided  by the  petitioning  industry,  which  in
some cases could  lead to high CVDs.  How these  considerations  affect  our
estimates  of average  CVD  margins  remains  unknown. In the  case  of Argentina,
for example,  the average  export  subsidy  between  1980  and 1984 is around  12
percent.  1/  In  contrast,  in  the  case  of  Peru  --  the  other  country  for  which  I
have  some  aggregate  estimates  --  the  figures  suggest  that  in 1981,  the  average
fiscal  subsidy  (Certificado  de  Exportaciones,  CERTEX)  was  15  percent  while  the
average  interest-rate  subsidy  could  have been  as  high as 6 percent  (Nogu6s,
1987). These  add to a  figure  quite  close  to the  average  CVD rate  applied  by
the US against imports  from this country.  For the other countries,  my
impression  is that except  for Chile  and Venezuela,  and in spite of small
sample  sizes the average  CVDs are quite representative  of average export
subsidies.  Chile  is  known  for  not  providing  export  subsidies  and  the  one  case
reported  in Table  1 is believed  to be an exception  to the  general  rule.  In
the  case  of  Venezuela  the  average  CVD  is  affected  by  one  extreme  observation.
With  these  qualifications,  the  figures  reported  in  Table  1 show  that
except for Venezuela,  the simple  average subsidy  margins are lower than
average  tariff  rates  (Table  1  column  1  and  3).  These  economy-wide  evidence  of
an anti-export  biases  hide  differences  at the  product  level. Also,  the  anti--
export  bias  is  even  higher  than  what  the  figures  on subsidies  and  tariff  rates
portray.  First,  average tariff  rates do not  incorporate  the protective
effects of NTBs, which in general,  benefit  heavily  protected  industries.
Second,  the structure  of protection  behind  average  tariff  rates  is far from
uniform.  In the countries  under consideration,  tariff  rates protecting
1/ This  excludes  reimbursement  of  indirect  taxes. See  Table  5 in  this  paper.manufacturing  industries  are  usually  the  highest,  and  always  higher  than  thtje
on nonproduced  goods  and  efficient  primary  sectors  (Balassa,  1982). This  is
important,  because in general it is precisely  the exports  undertaken  by
protected  manufacturing  industries  which  have  been  heavily  subsidized.
Table 1:  AVERAGE  CVD  MARGINS,  TARIFF  PROTECTION  AND
PERCENTAGE  FLUCTUATIONS  IN  ERs, DURING  THE  1900s
(1  )  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Maxim
Percentage
Average  Fluctuations  Averap
Country  CVD  Margins  (S)  In RERs  (S)  Tariff  Rates  (2) t  (1)  (3)  t  (1)
During 1960-87  (5)
Argentino  5  ;4  244  28  48.6  5.6
irazl  1  12  1l)  135  51  11.3  4.3
Chile  12  (1)  223  IS  18.6  1.3
Colambia  7  (0)  189  52  27.0  7.4
Costa Rica  17  (2)  152  24  8.9  1.4
Mexico  10 (19)  204  <25  20.4  2.8
Peru  25  (6)  131  >57  5.2  <2.2
Venezuela 69  (3)  224  34  3.2  O.5
Source: Colurn  I  estimated  from  affirmative  US  CVD  findings  the  number  which is  in  parenthesis;
column  2  from  Table 2 and  column  3 from  Laird  and Nogu6s  (1989).  Average  CVDs  are estimated  from
cases between  1960 and  1987.  Average  tariff  rates  have been  estimated during  1987-1968.  For
Colombia, Costa Rica,  Peru,  and Venezuela  these averages are  unweighted.  Finally,  < and  > stand
for  lower than and higher than respectively._9_
Suiing  up,  the measurements  of  the  anti-export  bias of Latin-
American  countries  undertaken  until  the  late 70s,  as  well  as representative
figures  for the 80s,  suggest  that  except  for  a few  years  and  few countries,
the anti-export  bias has remained  high.  It should  also be  mentioned  that
during  the 80s, trade policies  of Latin  American  countries  have been very
unstable  (Laird  and  Nogu6s,  1989).
2.2  Real  exchange  rate  (RtR)  instability
Table  2 shows  RERs  for  the  period  1976-1987.  Except  for  Brazil,  the
figures  show great variations.  In each of the severe  cases  of currency
overvaluation  shown  in this table  --  and  more generally  since WWII  - the
story  has been  the  same,  namely,  an attempt  to use  the  nominal  exchange  rate
as an anti-inflation  instrument  in the presence  of mounting  fiscal  deficits
and inflationary  pressures. Obviously,  the  message  ste  ming from repeated
episodes  of currency  overvaluation  is simple: "don't  expect  a favorable  RER
to last long."  In this environment,  there  is little  if any incentive  to
invest  in export  activities. Export  subsidies,  therefore,  can do little  to
reverse  these  negative  expectations.
Among  this  group  of countries,  Brazil  has  been thei  one  which  during
the 1960s  and  most  of the 1970s  has consistently  attempted  to avoid  episodes
of severe  currency  overvaluation  (Coes,  1988). This country  is also  the  one
which over time shows one of  the best record  of export performance  and
diversification  among  Latin-American  countries.
Finally,  in  Table  2, Perua  and  Venezuela  appear  as  having  a  relatively
low  instability  of  their  RERs. Nevertheless,  these  figures  hide  what  actually
are  complicated  exchange-rate  regimes as  both countries have escalated
comercial exchange  rates. For  example,  recently  in  Peru'  the  maximum- 10  -
Table  2: WEIGHTED  RiEAL  EXCHANGE  RATES  INOEXES  FOR  A
SAMPLE  OF LATIN-AMERICAN  COUNTRIES,  1978-87  1/
Year  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa Rica  Mexico  Peru  Venez.aela
1978  55  123  es  95  87  54  86  91
1979  77  113  66  96  I1  90  90  92
l980  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
1981  91  122  116  108  63  114  119  112
1982  51  128  107  115  73  82  123  121
1983  43  104  87  114  83  72  114  110
1984  50  104  85  105  82  84  114  94
1985  44  100  69  91  81  86  94  90
1966  44  95  58  6e  73  60  106  75
1987  41  95  53  61  66  56  125  54
!/ Weights  are  given  by  the  value  of trade  with the main trading  partners.  The  RER are
estimated  as  the  inverts  of the  nominal  exchange rate  times  the  ratio  of the  whol*esle-price
index  of the  trading  patrtners  to  the  domestic  wholesale  price  index.
Source:  Prepared  at  the  World  Bank  with  1W data.
commercial  exchange  rate  was more than four times  higher  than the minimum.
This multiple  exchange-rate  regime  is also used by Perua  in an effort to
promote  manufactured  exports.  This  is  done  by  granting  these  exports  the  more
- or  a mix of most  - attractive commercial exchange rates.  Thus, these
countries'  true  variability  of  their  RERs  is  higher  than  what  appears  to  be in
Table  2.
Column  4  in  Table  1,  presents the  ratio  between percentage
fluctuations  in  RERs  and  CVD  margins  as proxy  for  subsidies.  The  figures  show
that in Argentina,  the percentage  fluctuation  in the RER has been 49 times
higher  than  subsidies. This  pattern  is recorded  in the  other  countries,  but
the  differences  are not as high.  It is important  to recall,  that important
changes  in RERs  do not  occur  over  a period  of several  years,  but  often,  from
year  to year  or within  a two-year  period. In  Argentina,  the  real  devaluation- 11  -
was  44 percent  between  1981  and  1982;  in  Mexico  it  was  37 percent  between  1981
and  1983,  in  Peru'  it  was  39 percent  between  1976  and  1978;  and  in  Venezuela  it
was 15 percent  between  1983 and 1984.  Even for the sharpest  observers,
changes  of these  magnitudes  are  difficult  to predict,  and  what is  worse,  even
if  exporters foresee these  RERs  shifts, usually future markets are
underdeveloped  and  traders  cannot  cover  themselves.
In suaary, the  conclusion  is  that  proportional  instabilities  of  RERs
have been much higher  than subsidies. Therefore,  from the perspective  of
enhancing  the returns  to export  activities,  stabilizing  RERs appears  to be
significantly  more important  than the  policy  mix of high import  protection,
export  subsidies  and  unstable  RERs.
III. Export  Diversification  and  Export  Performance
Section  II argued  that one of the motives  for introducing  export
subsidies,  was to increase  the  relative  performance  of manufactured  exports,
thus  reducing  the  economic  consequences  of  the  forecasted  decline  in  the  terms
of trade  of raw-material  exporters. This section  also presented  estimates
showing  that  during  the  80s  subsidies  had  not  removed  the  anti-export  bias  and
that  the  RERs  have been  very  unstable. What  did  actually  happen  with export
diversification  and  export  performance?  This section  will first  discuss  the
casual  evidence  on export  diversification  and export  performance  and then
discuss  the  econometric  findings  on the  contribution  of subsidies  to  exports.
Table  3  presents the  ratio of  manufactured  exports to  total
exports.  This simple  but straightforward  measure  of export  diversification
shows  that  the  experience  of Latin-American  countries  has been  quite  diverse
but  on  average  disappointing.- 12  -
In Argentina,  the indicator  of export  diversification  has  remained
stable  over time. The  case  of  Argentina  is  quite  disappointing,  since  it  has
invested  important  sums  of  money  in  export  subsidies  (Table  5),  and  still  real
manufactured  exports  have  declined.
Table  3:  RATIO  OF MANUFACTURED  EXPORTS  TO  TOTAL  EXPORTS
IN  A SAMPLE  OF LATIN-AMERICAN  COUNTRIES
1970-74  1975-79  1980s  I/r
Argentina  19.2  24.7  22.5  (1980-87)
Brazil  18.2  28.9  39.9  (1980-85)
Chile  4.6  9.8  7.7  (1980-86)
Colombia  19.1  19.6  19.4  (1980-87)
Costa  Rica  21.1  22.5  26.6  (1980-84)
Mexico  37.1  27.2  17.7  (1980-85)
Peru  2.1  7.7  14.1  (1980-84)
Venezuela  1.4  1.4  1.9  (1980,81,83)
1/ Between  brackets  are  years  during  the  1980s  for  which  figures  are
available.
Source: U.N.  Statistical  Office.
Brazil  has diversified  significantly  in a context  of high export
growth.  As I will argue,  it is also one of the few cases  where export
subsidies  appear  to  have  contributed  significantly  to  export  performance.
Chile  is in our  sample,  the  non-subsidizer  country. In this  sense,
it  contrasts  with  Brazil. During  the  80s,  this  country's  uniform  tariff  rate
has fluctuated  between  10X and 35X.  Also, after 1982,  Chile has adopted
realistic  exchange  rate policies. In spite  of this,  Chile  remains  heavily
dependent  on  primary  exports.
In Columbia,  export  diversification  has remained  stagnant. During
the  80s,  the  export  diversification  ratio  has  declined  from  a  maximum  value  of
271  in 1981  to  a  minimum  of 14.6Z  in  1986.- 13  -
In Costa  Rica,  export  diversification  has  remained  stagnant.
In  Mexico,  export  diversification  shows  a  declining  trend  in spite  of
its  subsidy  policies. It should  be  said,  that  the  figures  for  the  1980s  hide
a recent  important  modification  of Mexico's  export  structure. While  in 1981
the ratio of manufactured  exports  to  total exports was  10 percent, it
treased  to 27 percent  in 1985  and  has risen  even  higher  since  then.  This
positive  trend  towards  export  diversification  has  been  recently  accelerated  by
further  devaluations  ond trade-liberalisation  measures.  For example,  non-
tariff  barriers  have  been  drastically  reduced  and  the  maximum  tariff  rate  has
declined  from 100Z to 20X (Laird  and Nogu6s,  1979).  Also, in early  1985,
Mexico  and  the  US signed  a bilateral  agreement  according  to  which  Mexico  would
dismantle  certain  subsidies  in return  for the US to apply the injury  test
(Nogu6s,  1986b).  Thus,  Mexico's  recent  manufactured-export  boom and export
diversification  has taken  place with  minimal  --  if at all  - export subsidies.
Perui  is an important  subsidizer  and also a country  which shows  a
positive  trend towards  export  diversification.  Nevertheless,  it would be
wrong to conclude  that  subsidies  have  contributed  to export  diversification.
First, export subsidy policies  had been implemented  long before export
diversification  began  to take  off  in the  mid-1970s.  Second,  between  1968  and
1975,  the  military-socialist  experiment  of  Velasco  Alvarado  took  place. These
were the  years  of growth  in fiscal  deficits  and  currency  overvaluation.  For
example,  during  1971-75,  the  RER  was 22 percent  higher  than  during  1976-80,
and  in 1975  it was 53  percent  higher  than  in 1979. These  figures  are  higher
than the average CERTEX rate, the major export-subsidy  program of  Peru
(Nogues,  1989). Thus,  the  increase  in export  diversification  of the  late  70s
was  a consequence  of the  significant  real  devaluation  of  these  years. Also,- 14  -
during  the  80s,  export  diversification  has  declined  from  a  maximum  of 17X  in
1980  to  a  minimum  of 142  in 1982.
Finally,  Venezuela  is  another  country  showing  a low  and  stagnant  rate
of export  diversification.
In summary,  until  the 80s, among the subsidizers  only Brazil  has,
succeeded  in increasing  systematically  its rate of export  diversification.
During the  80s, only Mexico have  been able to  diversify its  export
structure. But this  diversification  has taken  place  in a  context  where  no
export  subsidies  were  used.  In  policy  terms,  the  contrast  between  Mexico  and
Brazil is notable,  and one might  well wonder the extent to which export
subsidy  policies  really  contributed  to export  diversification  in this  latter
country. Later  I  will  return  to  this  important  issue.
Table  4 shows  the  percentage  growth  of  manufactured  imports  into  OECD
countries  from  Latin-American  countries  between  1980-1987.  This  is  taken  as a
proxy for export  performance. The reason  as said, is that the bulk of
manufactured  exports  that  do not go to industrial  countries  are affected  by
different  regional  trading  agreements  and  therefore,  do not  compete  with  other
efficient  exporters.
It should  be mentioned,  that these  figures  are presented  more for
completeness  of information,  and in no way should  be taken  to reflect  the
differential  effects  of export  subsidies.  Be  that  as it  may,  the  figures  tend
to confirm  the pattern  discussed  on export  diversification  i.e. those  that
diversify  are also successful  exporters  but successful  exporters  are not
necessarily  those  that  subsidize.  This  comes  out  by  comparing  the  experience
of Brazil  and  Mexico. In contrast,  important  subsidizers  such  as Argentina,
Colombia  and Peru'show  an extremely  poor  export  performance.  Costa  Rica  and- 15  -
Venezuela  have increased  their  manufactured xport quite importantly,  but
starting  from  a  low  base.
Table  4:  Change  and  OECD  Manufactured  Imports  from  a
Sample  of Latin-American  Countries,  1980-87  1/
Proportional  Change  in
Imports  in  1980  ($US  million)  Manufactured  Imports  1980-87
Country  OECD  US  OECD  US
Argentina  760.0  282.2  40  117
Brazil  3,445.0  1,348.4  238  264
Chile  89.8  35.9  124  169
Columbia  342.6  164.1  54  149
Costa  Rica  73.2  59.9  304  472
Mexico  4,106.6  3,635.4  239  345
Peru'  164.6  79.6  76  189
Venezuela  196.5  72.7  118  352
East  Asian  NICs  2/  37,919.2  16,829.3  190  350
1/  Estimated  from  nominal  dollar  figures.
2/  Includes  Hong Kong,  Korea,  Singapore,  &nd Taiwan,  Republic  of  China.
Source  From  UN Comtrade  data  base.
2.  The  econometric  evidence
So  far,  I  have  argued  that  among  those  countries  who have  diversified
and  enjoyed  a  statisfactory  export  performance,  only  Brazil  did  it  in  a
context  of  export  subsidies.  Thus,  the  evidence  to  support  export  subsidy
policies  is  weak. How about  the  econometric  literature?  Does  this  literature
provide  a  stronger  support  for  export  subsidies?  The  answer  is  no.  Let  me
first  emphasize  that  several  authors  have  reported  positive  supply
elasticities  of manufactured  exports  of LDCs.  These  include  Balassa  et al.
(1986)  for  Greece  and  Korea;  Schydlowsky  et at. (1983)  for  Per6;  Cardoso  and
Dornbusch  (1980)  for Brazil;  Moran (1988)  for groupings  of 15 developing
countries,  etc.- 16  -
These  findings are  reassuring;  in  spite of  the  macroeconomic
instability  of  several  of these  countries,  policymakers  can  be  quite  confident
that  exports of  manufactured  products will  respond to  exchange rate
policies.  Nevertheless,  recent research  by Caballero  and  Corbo (1988)
suggests  that instability  and uncertainty  are likely  to reduce  the price
responsiveness  of exports. After  developing  and  testing  an econometric  model
where  instability  can  have  a negative  role  on exports,  these  authors  conclude
that  export  response  "...  is  not  only  a function  of current  export  incentives
but  also a function  of the  stability  of  these  incentives."  In the  empirical
test, Caballero  and Corbo used data from Chile, Colombia,  Korea, Peru,
Philippines,  Thailand  and  Turkey.
Thus,  appropriate  price  signals  as well as  the stability  of these
signals  are crucial  policies  for improving  manufactured-export  performance.
How  about  the  contribution  of subsidies?  The  literature  I  have  surveyed  shows
that in very few cases has  research  shown a  statistically  significant
contribution  of  subsidies  to exports.  I presume that many people have
attempted  to measure  this contribution,  but few have been successful. Of
those  who  have  reported,  mention  should  be  made  of  Balassa  et.  al. (1986),  who
attempted  to quantify  the separate  contribution  of subsidies  and report  that
decomposing  the export-price  variable  into'.. the world  market  price,  the
exchange  rate,  and export  subsidies  have  not  given  statistically  significant
results..."
Among Latin  American  countries,  Brazil  is the only one for which
econometric  estimates  have shown  a statistically  significant  contribution  of
subsidies  to exports  (see  Tyler  1976  and  Coes  1979).  1/ Other  countries  for
1/ Baumann  and  Braga  (1988)  recently  found  a significant  partial  correlation
between  subsidies  and  exports. Unfortunately,  these  authors  did  not test
their  hypothesis  in  a multivariate  regression  analysis.- 17  -
which in a  multivariate  regression  analysis  explaining  export  performance,
subsidies  have  been  statistically  significant  include  Korea  (Westphal  and  Kim,
1982)  and  Turkey  (Faini,  1988). Thus,  in relation  to the  number  of  countries
who have and continue  to use subsidy  policies,  the econometric  evidence  in
their  behalf  is  extremely  weak.
To conclude  this  section,  I  would  like  to  stress  some  characteristics
of Brazil's  experience  which  help to understand  why export  subsidies  might
have made a  positive  contribution.  The unique  characteristics  refer  to the
policy  package  of the  1964-65  policy  shift  towards  outward  orientation,  which
lasted  until  the  mid  70s. The  outward-oriented  industrial  base  created  during
these  years,  helps  to understand  these  country's  recent  export  performance  in
spite of  its own as  well as  industrial  countries  recent protectionist
policies.
First,  when Brazil  introduced  its  export  subsidy  programs,  it also
liberalized  its import  controls. In contrast,  when  the  other  Latin-American
countries  introduced  export  subsidies,  import  barriers  were  not  reduced  and  in
some cases, they continued  to rise.  The second  major characteristic  of
Brazil's  program  was its  successful  attempt  at stabilizing  the real  exchange
rate.  No other  country  in Latin-American  has had  as stable  a real  exchange
rate as the one enjoyed  by Brazil  between  1965 and the early 70s.  Some
authors  such  as Coes (1988),  suggest  that the  currency  remained  stable  but
overvalued and  export subsidies compensated  at  least partly for  this
overvaluation.  Finally,  at the  time,  the  political  comitment towards  export
growth  was very  high  and not  only  trade  and  exchange  rate  policies  supported
this commitment  but also as well,  other  policies  such  as openness  to direct
foreign investment  also contributed  to the success.  These differential
characteristics  are  crucial  for  understanding  Brazil's  export  growth  and  the- 18  -
likely  contribution  of export  subsidies  in an environment  that  was  conducive
towards  higher  exports.
This is  not to say  that Brazil's  outward-oriented  policies  are the
best.  The recent  evidence  from  Mexico  suggest  a better  policy  package  of
which,  the  major  components  are  an appropriate  real  exchange  rate,  low  import
barriers  and  no export  subsidies.  Under  conditions  of full  employment  such  a
policy package is likely  to result  in lower welfare  costs than Brazil's
strategy.
V.  Social  Costs and Political-Economy  of Export  Subsidies  in Argentina
So far the positive  analysis,  shows  that the support  in favor  of
export  subsidies  is  extremely  weak,  and  that  in  only  rare  occasions  have  these
subsidies  contributed  significantly  to  export  growth. But  even  on these  rare
occasions,  it cannot  be concluded  that  subsidies  have  contributed  positively
to economic  development. A close  inspection  to welfare  considerations  and
political-economy  effects,  suggests  that export subsidies  could contribute
negatively  to economic  welfare. This  would  be the  case in  a situation  where
subsidies  do not contribute  to export  growth  but only to misallocation  of
resources  reinforcement  of oligopoly  position  and  directly  unproductive  rent-
seeking  activities.
Unfortunately,  when the  analayses  gets into  welfare  and political-
economy  issues,  the available  evidence  is  weak if at all  existent. In this
section  I will report  some stories  on Argentina  a country  for which  I will
conclude,  export  subsidies  contributed  negatively  to economic  development.
The  evidence  shows  some  of the  dimensions  by  which  subsidy  programs  can  result
in social  costs.  In the first  part  of this section,  I will discuss  the
available  evidence  on welfare  considerations  while the second  will look at
some  aspects  of the  political-economy  of  export  subsidies.- 19  -
1.  Welfare  costs  of export  subsidies
There are several  reasons  why export subsidies  could results in
social  losses. Here,  I  will  emphasize  their  fiscal  effects;  their  impact  on
exchange rate misalignment;  their anti-employment  bias and  their anti-
efficient  export  bias.
Fiscal  deficits  and  inflation
Table 5 provides  estimates  of the fiscal  costs of export subsidy
programs. According  to these  estimates,  during  1980-84,  the  average  annual
value  of export  incentives  has been  US$427.4  million. This  represents  close
to 0.7Z of CDP and 32 percent  of the value  of promoted  exports. Excluding
reimbursements  of  indirect  taxes  and  drawbacks,  the  ratio  of  export  incentives
to promoted  exports  drops  to 12 percent. This is  an underestimation  of the
true fiscal  costs of export-subsidy  policies.  For example,  the value of
export subsidies  listed  in Table 5 does not include  a number of hidden
programs,  such  as the  provision  of government-produced  goods  and services  at
subsidized  prices,  government guarantees provided  to  uncreditworthy
enterprises,  and  others  which  I  will  report  below  in  Table  6.
Direct  and indirect  export  subsidies  add to the  fiscal  deficits  and
therefore,  to  the  inflationary  !%rocess  and  are  a  hindrance to  price
stabilization  efforts.  In this way, a vicious  circle  of costly  economic
policies  can  arise  over  time. Protectionist  trade  policies  and  unstable  real
exchange  rates result  in a lack of export  diversification  and poor export
performance. This, in turn, leads to the maintenance  and enhancement  of
export-subsidy  programs,  which in turn  add to the fiscal  deficits  which in
turn  lead  to  currency  overvaluation  and  RER  instability,  etc.- 20  -
Table  5: VALUE  OF  EXPORTS  AND  EXPORT  INCENTIVES,  1980-84
(million  of  dollars)
Total
1960  1961  1982  1983  1984  1900-84
1. Total  exports  8,021.4  9,143,0  7,624.9  7,836.1  8,107.4 40,733.0
2.  Industrial  Exports  1,506.0  1,468.0  1,554.0  1,038.0  1,121.0  6,689.0
3.  Value  of  Export  Incentivos  457.7  646.4  129.t1 184.5  318.7  2,137.1
- RsImburswrents  362.9  431.4  349.3  96.1  111.7  1,353.5
- Additional  Reimbursaments  12.1  11.2  4.3  0.7  - 20.3
- Drawback  -0.3  0.8  2.3  2.9  2.0  8.4
- Southern  Ports  - - - - 28.7  28.7
- Tierra  del  Fuego  - 2.2  3.1  2.9  5.9  14.0
- Sugar  Compensation  7.8  7.9  2.4  0.5  0.7  19.4
- Financial  Incentives  74.5  192.9  108.4  79.3  169J6  681.7
4. Benefits  as  a  S  of  promoted  exports  (3t2)  0.30  0.44  0.34  0.18  0.28  0.32
5. REER  Index  (1980u100)  100.00  82.1  49.2  46.9  50.5  58.4
Source: Lines  1&2  from  table  4  and line  3  in  CEPAL  (1986).
Export  subsidies  and  exchange  rate  misalignment
The figuras  in  Table  5 show  that  the  maximum rate  of export  subsidy
(line  4)  occurred  in  1981.1  This  coincides  with  the  second  highest  estimate  of
real  exchange  rate  recorded  since  1978. In contrast,  during  1983  when  the  RER
reached  its lowest  value,  the  rate  of export  subsidies  was  the  lowest  in the
series. Therefore,  during  the  1980s  there  has  been  a tendency  to  adjust  the
aggregate  amount  of export  subsidies  to changes  in the real  exchange  rates.
The policy  of compensating  instruments  in this  way has  destabilized  the  RER- 21  -
with negative  consequences  to efficient  exports  and social  welfare.  Only
import-substitute  interests  benefit  from a policy  mix of high RER on their
intermediate  and capital  goods imports  and high export  subsidies  for their
exports. But  society  at  large  loses.
The  anti-labor  bias  of xport-subsidy  policies
As said, in Argentina  as well as other Latin-American  countries,
protection  has  favored  the  manufacturing  sector  particularly  capital-intensive
industries.  For  example,  relatively  protected  manufacturing  industries  are  41
percent  more  intensive  in  capital  than  the  efficient  exportable  manufacturing
industries,  a great  majority  of which  corresponds  to the foodstuff  industry
(Nogu6s,  1983,  for  Argentina,  and  Krueger  1983  for  other  countries)
In addition,  capital-intensive  industries  are the ones which have
received  the  bulk  of industrial  as  well  as  export-subsidy  assistance  (Artana,
1986, CEPAL,  1986  and 1988,  Nogu6s  1983  and World Bank 1988).  Therefore,
Argentina's  export  subsidies  have favored  capital  to the  detriment  of labor.
The  social costs associated  with this anti-labor  bias of  subsidies  has
increased  during  the 1980s  pari  passu  with the  decline  in real  wages,  higher
urban  unemployment,  and  increase  in  c.pital  costs.
The  anti-efficient  export  bit  of  protection  and  export-subsidy
policies
I  have  argued,  that  protectik-n  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  foreign
exchange  earnings.  In  a  comprehensive  empirical  study,  Sturzenegger  (1988),
has  recently  estimated  that  if  during  the  1980s  protection  had  been
dismantled,  Argentina's  agricultural  sector  would  have  exported  approximately
US$6  billion  more  per  year  than  what  it  actually  exported;  i.e.,  70  percent
more  than  what  has  been  exported  in  recent  years.- 22  -
What  is  the  relation  between these export losses and  export
subsidies? There  are several  ways  in which  one can link  both factors. One
way is to look  at the  flows  of taxes  and subsidies. Because  of its clear
comparative  advantage,  Argentina's  agricultural  sector  has  been one of the
most discriminated  against  by protectionist  economic  policies. For example,
Sturzenegger  (1988)  finds  that  approximately  50 percent  of the  agricultural
gross-domestic  product  is transferred  to  other  sectors  of the  economy  through
export  and other  taxes.  It is thus reasonable  to assume  that part  of the
export  subsidies  have been financed  by the agricultural  sector.  This has
implied  a reallocation  of resources  out of relatively  efficient  industries
into  inefficient  ones.  In this  sense,  it can  be argued  that  export  subsidies
have an anti-efficient  export  bias and therefore,  imply  a loss of foreign
exchange  earnings. This  anti-efficient  export  bias  is  worsened  when  subsidies
are  used  to  compensate  for  an  overvalued  currency.  1/
2.  Political-economy  aspects  of subsidies
In what follows  I provide  some  insights  into the political-economy
consequences  of  export subsidy policies in  Argentina.  Unfortunately,
political-economy  aspects  have not been researched  and therefore,  I have
resorted  to reports  on some  scattered  evidence  of how  subsidy  policies  can  be
co-opted  and  corrupted  at  a cost  to the  rest  of the  society. My suspicion,  is
that  I  have  only  touched  the  tip  of the  iceberg.
Rent-seeking  and  bureaucratic  costs
In general,  the  introduction  of a subsidy  creates  two social  groups
which will tend to support  it over time.  On the one hand, we have the
1/  If land  rents  are to be transferrd  to other  parts  of society,  then the
appropriate  way  of  doing  it  is  with  a  land  tax. The  successful  opposition
by land  owners  to  such  a tax,  is  also  discussed  by  Sturzenegger.- 23  -
economic groups that benefit from the subsidy,  and on  the other, the
bureauc-'acy  whose  existence  and salaries  are justified  bv the controls  they
are called  to exercise  to distribute  the subsidies. Both the rent-seeking
(subsidy-seeking)  activities  and the bureaucracy  are social  costs to the
national  economy,  i.e.,  resources engaged  in  directly  unproductive
activities. 1/  These  costs  are in addition  to the  welfare  loss  associated
with  the  resource  misallocation.
There are several  questions  of  interest  to analyze here.  How
important  are  subsidy-seeking  activities?  How  important  and  efficient  are  the
bureaucratic  resources  associated  with the  control  of subsidies? Finally,
what is the importance  and growth  of the welfare loss  attributed  to the
export-subsidy  policies?
In regard  to the  importance  of the  subsidy-seeking  activities,  it is
most illustrative  to quote the Undersecretary  of Economy  under Alfonsin's
presidency.  He has  stated  that  "...  a  great  part  of the  Argentine  economy  is
decided in the corridors  of the Ministry  of Economy  and of the Central
Bank...."  and  that"...  it is  more  profitable  to spend  time  in  these  corridors
than  in the  manufacturing  plant. He also  states  that  over  time  "...  the  state
is being divided into numerous  windows,  each of which responds  to some
corporative  lobby...."  (Canitrot,  1986,  author's  translation) It is clear
that  policymakers  feel  pressed  by powerful  interest  groups  whose  major intent
is  to  extract  some  form  of  subsidies  --  including  export  subsidies  --  from  the
Government.
1/  The  theory  of rent-seeking  activities  is  discussed  in  Olson  (1982). The
bureaucracy  is  a cost  only  if it  controls  bad  policies.  This  is  the  case
of export  subsidies  when  they  attract  resources  into  more  inefficient
uses.- 24  -
One  consequence  of subsidy-seeking  activities  is the growth  in the
number  of these  programs. A comprehensive  study  published  by CEPAL  (1986),
summarizes  the  highly  visible  export-subsidy  policies  of  Argentina.  According
to this study,  subsidy  policies  were introduced  in 1962,  when the drawback
regime  was  put  into  effect. Shortly  after,  in  1963,  the  government  introduced
the  financing  of  exports  at subsidized  interest  rates,  and towards  the  end  of
the 1960s,  special  fiscal  compentsation  was paid to exports produced  with
sugar,  a product  having  important  employment  effects  in two  provinces  (Jujuy
and Tucuman)  and whose imports  are banned.  Over time, the list of highly
visible  export-subsidy  policies  has  multiplied.  It  now  includes  the  following
instruments:  1/ a) drawbacke;  b) reimbursements*;  c)  additional  reimbursement
for exports  going to new markets;  d) additional  reimbursements  for exports
shipped  through  southern  ports  ; e) additional  reimbursements  introduced  in
1972  for  exports  going  to  and  coming  from  the  special  territory  of  Tierra  del
Fuego  ; f) additional  reimbursements  introduced  during  the early 1980s  for
exports shipped by  the  customs of  Salta  and  Jujuy  ;  g)  additional
reimbursements  introduced  in 1985 and provided  to specific  enterprises  who
sign a contract  with the government  for  marginal  increase  of exports  ; h)
prefinancing  of exports at preferential  interest  rates; i) financing  of
exports  at preferential  interest  rates  ; j)  a couple  of temporary  admission
regimes  introduced  during  the  1980s*;  k) special  treatment  granted  to turnkey
exports;  1) fiscal  credit  on account  of the income  tax equivalent  to 10
percent  of the  f.o.b.  value  of exportsl  and  m) exemption  from  payment  of the
1/ Not  all  of them  are  used  all  the  time. I indicate  with  an  asterisk  the
programs  that  are  currently  used.- 25  -
value-added  tax.*  In addition  Table  6 will show  that  hidden  subsidies  have
also  been  used.
Probably,  the  most important  coment one  can  make  to this  large  list
of policies  is that,  except  in the  case  of exemptions  from  the  payment  of the
value-added  tax  - which  together  with  reimbursements  of indirect  taxes  should
not be considered  export  subsidies  - all  the rest  are discriminatory.  Laws
and decrees  from  the  Ministry  of Economy  and  circulars  from  the  Central  Bank
are  usually  accompanied  with  appendices  which  list  the  products  and/or  regions
and/or  firms  which  are  entitled  to  receive  the  subsidies.
Note  that,  not  only  the  number  but  also  the  goals  of export  subsidies
have multiplied  over time.  Initially  as said,  subsidies  were  designed  with
the intent of diversifying  and promoting  nontraditional  exports.  Today
nevertheless,  subsidies  also seek  to promote  exports  through  specific  ports,
from  specific  regions,  and  from  particular  firms.
What explains  this  process? Much  of it  can  be explained  by a growth
in  the  economic  mnd  political  power  of  corporative  groups  who  benefit  from  the
subsidies.  Ultimately,  interest  groups  have co-opted  the state  to such a
degree  that  it  has  lost  independence  of  action.
Bribery  and  corruption
I  have  stated  that  the  bureaucratic  costs  associated  with  the  control
of export subsidies  are high.  I will now argue  that the efficacy  of the
system  to control  the  size  and  destination  of the  subsidies  can  be seriously
questioned.
The low efficacy  of the  system  is not so much associated  with the
qualifications  of the  bureaucracy  to  administer  the  rules  applicable  to  export
subsidies,  but  to the  opportunities  for  corruption  that  it  allows. For  exam-
ple,  a given  product  can  be exported  several  times  through  southern  ports.- 26  -
Recall, that each time a good is exported  through  one of these ports,  a
reimbursement  is  paid  by the  treasury.
I  might  add  that  it  is not  necessary  to  act illegally  to  plunder  the
treasury. For  example,  close-to-fake  but  legal  factories  have  been  installed
in  promoted  regions. Thus,  for  example,  an entrepreneur  manufacturing  canned
tomatoes,  ships  the  cans  from  the  factory  located  in  an unpromoted  region  to  a
small  plant  in  a promoted  region  where  the  only  processing  that  takes  place  is
the sticking  of labels. When this  is done,  all the value  of the  output  of
this  close-to-fake  plant  receives  a tax  reimbursement.  A documented  case  has
been  reported  by Artana  (1987),  who  concludes  that  four  provinces,  which  have
granted  industrial-promotion  incentives,  have an installed  capacity  of steel
processing  "...  sufficient  to  produce  the  output  of the  whole  country  when,  in
fact,  steel  is  being  produced  and  consumed  in  other  provinces...."
Unfortunately,  when  one  gets  into  issues  of  bribery  and  corruption  it
is difficult  to come up with hard  evidence. Nevertheless,  the  magnitude  of
the potential  social  costs  of the system  can  be assessed  by reporting  on a
frAud  case  in  detriment  of the  Central  Bank. Recall  that  one  of the  subsidies
is a  credit  for prefinancing  exports.  The purpose  of this credit is to
finance  the productive  processes  of the  nontraditional  goods  that  are to be
exported. The  credit  is in  Australes  and  adjusted  by the  exchange  rate;  the
intrest  rate  is  one  percent  per  year;  well  below  international  levels.  1/
In general,  up to 70 percent  of the  f.o.b.  value  can  be financed  and  up to a
maximum  of 180  days.  I say  in  general,  because  in some  cases  such  as ships,
1/  The  rate  has  only  recently  been  increased,  but  it  still  remains  below  that
prevailing  in  international  markets.- 27  -
the proportion  to be financed  can increase  to  90 percent  of f.o.b.  value  and
the period  of financing  can be  *xtended  to three  years.  This degree of
freedom  is  negotiable  on  a case-by-case  basis.
In  this  regard,  the  most  newsworthy  case  was  a  fraud  and  bribery  case
committed  by  a  ship-building  company.  When the bulk of the financial
resources  had  been  disbursed,  it  was  noticed  that  construction  of the  ship  had
hardly  begun. Although  this  case  is still  in the  courts,  the  reports  suggest
that the  size  of the fraud  can be put in the  order  of US$100  million,  i.e.,
approximately  one quarter  of the annual  outlay  of the treasury  for export-
subsidy  purposes.  1/  (Comunicado  6857 of the Central  Bank and Cronista
Commercial,  September  22, 1986).  This I presume  is a case --  albeit  an
important  one  - among  several  that  remain  unnoticed.
Countervailing  duties
Internationally,  there  is  no  agreement  on  the  type  of  export
subsidies  that  are  allowed;  the  Subsidy  Code  only  offers  an  "illustrative"
list of prohibited  subsidies. Therefore,  countries  such as Argentina  that
subsidize  their  exports  run the risk of being  countervailed  in the market
where these  duties  are used.  This  occurs  mainly  when exports  go to the US,
the  country  that  has  used  countervailing  duties  most  often  at a high  cost  not
only  to itself  but  also  to  other  countries  (Finger  and  Nogu6s,  1987).
1/  There  are  several  ways  in  which  fraud  can  be  comitted against
prefinancing  of  exports. For  example,  the  controlling  authority  has  no
way of  knowing  the  period  during  which  the  processing  process  is
completed.  Another  way  in  which  fraud  can  be undertaken  is  to  request
extensions  of the  expiration  date  of the  loans  to the  Central  Bank  and
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Table  6 presents  a suoary of the characteristics  of the counter-
vailing-duty  investigations  of  the  US  against  Argentina.  Ten  subsidy  policies
have  been  countervailed.  An  estimate  of one  dimension  of the  social  costs  of
CVDs is provided  by the value of the transfer  from Argentina  to the US
Treasury.  This can be estimated  by multiplying  the CVD rate times the
quantity  exported. The figure  comes  out to approximately  US$3.5  million  in
1983.  Although  this  cost  is  low,  it  is  only  part  of the  costs  confronted  by
the  subsidizers  when  their  subsidies  are  countervailed  or  threatened  to  be
countervailed.  Another  important  part  of  this  cost  is the  harassment  effect
of  CVDs  and  the  legal  costs  associated  with  these  policies  (Finger  and  Nogu6s,
1987).
Subsidies  for  state  monopoly
In  Argentina,  the  steel  industry  has  been  dominated  and  controlled  by
Sociedad  Mixta  Siderurgica  (SOMISA),  part  of the  military-industrial  complex
controlled  by Fabricaciones  Militares.
In  spite of  its inward-oriented  nature, SOMISA, as many other
protected  firms,  usually  undertakes  exports  when there  is a recession  in the
domestic  market. It was  during  1983,  when this  firm  faced  a countervailing-
duty investigation  in the US.  It can be seen from  Table 6, that SOMISA's
exports  received  many subsidies. Of the  six programs  that  were  effectively
countervailed  by the  US, five  of them  were  not  used  in other  investigations,
i.e.,  SOMISA  seems  to have benefited  from  five  tailor-made  subsidies. These
policies include capital infusions  and  loan guarantees  provided to  an
uncreditworthy  firm;  petroleum  provided  at subsidized  prices  by another  state
enterprise;  exemption  from the tax on capital;  and exemption  from import
tariffs  which  at that time  was granted  exclusively  to SOMISA. Finally,  the- 30  -
countervailing  duty  applied  against  Argentina  in the  case of SOMISA  was 6.4
percent. Obviously,  this  countervailing  duty  has  implied  a social  cost  to  the
country. Nevertheless,  this  cost  appears  to be significantly  lower  than  the
cost society  has paid for  sustaining  a monopolistic  and  politically  powerful
industry  and  reducing  competition.  It  is for these reasons that the
liberalization  of the steel  industry,  implemented  in early 1988,  has been a
significant  economic  measure  of  Alfonsin's  administration.  1/
Loans  to uncreditworthy  countries
Argentina  has  also  lost  money  in  several  instances  of turnkey-export
operations. These  exports  are financed  by long-term  loans  to the  countries
importing  them. At the  same  time,  the  Central  Bank  assures  the  exporter  that
his  bill  will  be  paid  by  the  time  the  physical  operation  is finished.
As the Central  Bank assumes  all the risk,  the incentives  for the
exporter  to check  the  creditworthiness  of the  importer  is eliminated.  As has
been the case with several financial  institutions  around the world, the
Central  Bank  has  not  been  able  to  predict  the  serious  financial  troubles  into
which  many  countries  would  get  into.
Unofficial  estimates  put the.  loss to Argentina  of bad loans  at a
level  which  could  be as high as US$l  billion. Ofne  thing  is clear;  if  the
Central  Bank  had  not  subsidized  these  exports  nor  engaged  in  granting  loans  to
I/  Even during 1979-1982  when the trade regime of Argentina  was being
liberalized  and protection  was generally  granted  by declining  ad valorem
tariffs,  the  products  produced  by the steel  industry  were one  of the  few
which  continued  under  a  regime  of import  licensing.  Obviously,  one  reason
was that the  country  was  theit  governed  by  the  military,  the  owner  of the
enterprise  (Nogu6s,  1986a). An idea  of the  magnitude  of the protection
provided  to the  steel  industry  is  given  by the  fact  that  towards  the  end
of the 1970s,  the effective  rate of protection  was around  90 percent;
among  the  highest  in  a sample  of  manufacturing  industries.- 31  -
risky  countries,  the financial  troubles  of Argentina  would  be less serious
today  than  what  they  are.
V.  The  Parallels  Between  the  Consequences  of Export  Eubsidies  and
Countervailing  Policies
The positive  analysis  of the experience  with export  subsidies  in
Latin  America  suggests  that  the  support  in favor  of this  policy  is extremely
weak. Also,  when in  addition  to  the  positive  analysis,  welfare  and  political-
economy  considerations  are introduced  into  the  picture,  the support  in favor
of subsidies  weakens  still  further.  To  recapitulate,  I have  shown,  that  it is
possible  and in some  countries  --  Argentina  --  likely for  export subsidies  to:
- Benefit  the  exports  of relatively  protected  and  powerful  enterprises,
thus  reinforcing  oligopoly  positions;
- Have  a  tendency  to compensate  fluctuations  in  RERs;
- Have  an  anti-efficient  export  bias;
- Have an anti-employment  bias;
- Have an inflationary  bias;
- Tax the consumers;
- Create  incentives for  directly  unprodue.tive  subsidy-seeking
activities;
- Create  opportunities  for  bribery  and  corruption;  and
- Fail  to  improve  aggregate  export  performance  of subsidized  exports.
These  dimensions  of the  problems  with  subsidies  that  benefit  exports
are  independent  of countervailing  measures  (CVMs).  But CVMs add other
problems  to subsidizing  countries,  namely,  that  they  increase  the  uncertainty
of access  to  the  markets  of  countervailing  countries  and  in  cases  of- 32  -
affirmative  findings,  create  a transfer  of funds  from  the subsidizing  to the
countervailing  country.
The risks  of CVMS  for  the  countervailers  having  similar  consequences
to subsidies  can  be  non-negligible.  For  example,  countervailing  measures  can
have  several  social  costs,  including:
- Protection  of importable  industries  (Finger  et al., 1982),  which in
some  cases  might  reinforce  oligopoly  positions  (Messerlin,  1989);
- Their use as an  instrument  to compensate  fluctuations  in RERs
(Balassat  1988);
- An anti-efficient  export  bias  which  is the  direct  consequence  of the
previous  effects;
- Taxing  the  consumers;
- Creating  directly  unproductive  protection-seeking  activities;
- Increasing  market uncertainty  and harassment  (Finger  and Nogu6s,
1987);
Perhaps,  the  major  difference  could  be that  bribery  and corruption
seem to affect  CVM policies  less  than subsidies. In contrast,  much of the
rent-seeking  activities  is directed  to changing  the  legal  rules  so that  CVMs
can  be  used  more  easily  by  the  protected  groups  (Grinols,  1988). One  apparent
plus of CVDs is the funds  which  they are able to extract  from subsidizing
countries. Whether  this  is really  a plus,  depends  on what is done with the
funds.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper has discussed  the experience  of several  Latin-American
countries  with export subsidies.  More than 20 years ago, the economic
reasoning  on export  subsidies  suggested  that they would result in higher
export  diversificaticn  and  performance.  In  contrast,  experience  shows  that  at- 33  -
the macro-level,  this  has generally  not occurred. I have argued,  that the
reason  for this  has been  that,  in a  majority  of cases,  export  subsidies  were
not supported  by more open import  policies. As a result,  export  subsidies
reduced  only marginally  the anti-export  bias of Latin-American  countries.
Additional  negative  effects  on exports  have  come  from  very  unstable  RERs.
In Brazil,  the one country  where export  subsidies  appear to have
resulted  in a positive  contribution  to exports,  they were accompanied  by
import liberalization,  significant  stabilization  of  the  RERs and  other
policies  conducive  to  export  growth. I  have  also  compared  Brazil  with  Mexico
who  during  recent  years  have  performed  very  well  in terms  of exports  in spite
of having  at most,  minimum  export  subsidies.  I have  suggested  that  for  equal
degrees  of export  success  the  strategy  of Mexico  is likely  to entail  lower
social  costs  than  that  of Brazil.
In  contrast to  Brazil the  experience  of  other Latin American
countries  with  export  subsidies  and  in particular  that  of Argentina,  has  been
a  failure. Perhaps,  Argentina  is  an  extreme  case,  where  subsidy  policies  have
been  detrimental  to  development.  But  it  could  also  be that  perhaps,  it is  one
of the  few  countries  where  social  1 .. d political-economy  costs  have  been  looked
at more carefully.  For example,  corruption  always  detracts  from whatever
benefit  subsidy  policies  might  have.  And  corruption  of subsidies  appears  to
be quite prevalent. For  example,  in a recent  article,  The Financial  Times
quotes  Mr.  McGregor  --  Britain's  Agriculture  Minister  --  as saying  that  it is
clear  that  the  fraud  problem  with  EC agricultural  subsidies  "...is  very  large
indeed." Mr.  Hermann  (Financial  Times,  February  13,  1989)  estimates  that  this
fraud "...  has reached  ECU $6 billion,  about a tenth  of the EC budget."
Another  instance  of fraud,  is reported  by  Milanovic  in  his study  on  Turkey,  a
country  where  subsidies  have  been  used  in an environment  conducive  to export- 34  -
success. In this case, the fraud  against  the tax rebate  program  led to
fictitious  exports  estimated  to have been  between  "...  5 and 10 percent  of
total Turkey's  exports..."  (Milanovic,  1986,  p. 12)  These are very high
figures  which  cast  further  doubts  on  the  social  benefit  of export  subsidies.
With this background  I will conclude  this paper  with three brief
remarks. First,  so  far,  the  participants  on  the  negotiations  on  subsidies  and
CVMs seem  to be seeking  two  major  goals. For  the  subsidizers,  the  goal  is to
have rules  that  would  make  the  introduction  of CVMs  more  difficult. For  the
countervailers,  the  goal  is to  have  more  stringent  rules  on subsidies.  Thus,
both subsidies  and CVMs are seen as good policies  by their  users.  The
evidence  of this  paper  that  these  conclusions  are not supported  by empirical
evidence  and  strongly  suggests  that export subsidies  and  countervailing
measures  imply  costs  to  the  sccieties  using  them.
Second,  the failure  of  export  subsidies,  particularly  in the  case  of
Argentina,  should  serve  as a reminder  for  economists  and  policymakers,  of the
importance  of distinguishing  what is possible  from what is likely.  It is
always possible to put forward  arguments  and create  models that show a
positive  impact  of subsidies. The crucial  thing  when making  policy  is to
assess  the possibility  and likelihood  of the  consequences  expected  from the
analysis.  In this regard,  the major  conclusion  of this paper  is that the
likelihood  of subsidies  having  an important  positive  effect  on exports  is low,
when they are applied  in a context  of high import  protection  and unstable
RERs.,
Finally,  I would like to emphasize  the social  preoccupation  with
which  this paper started.  Export subsidies  are  competing with  other
governmental  programs,  in a period  when the welfare  of Latin-America  has
declined  dramatically  and increasing  numbers of people are falling into- 35  -
conditions of extreme misery.  If export subisidies  are  recognized to be  a
failure,  they  should  be dismantled. I'm  sure  that  these  resources  could  be
invested  in more productive  uses for  example in  health and education projects.- 36  -
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